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Abstract
Class-size reduction (CSR) policies have typically failed to produce
large achievement gains. One common explanation is that CSR forces
schools to hire low-quality teachers. Prior studies of this hypothesis have
been hindered by poor data. Using different data, we find that hiring
quality did fall with state-wide CSR. However, this drop was temporary
due to attrition by the lowest performers. Furthermore, the drop was
similar for schools classified as treated and control for prior evaluations
of CSR. Therefore, differences in the quality of incoming teachers cannot
explain the estimated performance of CSR. This is consistent with hiring
spillovers in connected markets.
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1 Introduction
The potential for student achievement gains from smaller classes has been well
documented in experimental and quasi-experimental research (Krueger 1999;
Krueger & Whitmore 2001; Angrist & Lavy 1999). For instance, analysis
of the Tennessee STAR class-size experiment has found that being randomly
assigned to a small (13-17 students) class as opposed to a larger class (22-
25 students) in early elementary school has both short and long run effects
on students. In particular, students in smaller classes had test scores roughly
one-fifth of a standard deviation better on average (Krueger 1999), better long
run educational attainment (Krueger & Whitmore 2001), and better labor
market outcomes (Chetty et al. 2011). As of 2005, this potential led to the
adoption of class-size reduction (CSR) measures in thirty-two states (Council
for Education Policy, Research and Improvement (CEPRI) 2005).
To date, studies of CSR policies find only mixed evidence of achievement ef-
fects, with estimates consistently falling short of what might be expected from
the experimental research (Bohrnstedt & Stecher 2002, Chingos 2012).1 Due to
the high costs of implementation, $21 billion over nine years in Florida (Florida
Department of Education) and $1.5 billion a year in California (Bohrnstedt
& Stecher 1999), the efficacy of CSR policies has been called into question.
One common explanation for the under performance of CSR is that it forces
schools to hire and retain teachers of lower quality in order to meet the class-
size requirements (Stecher & Bohrnstedt 2000; Imazeki n.d.; Buckingham
2003; CEPRI 2005, Chingos 2012). The gains from having smaller classes
are thought to be offset by having teachers of lower quality in the classroom.
Previous studies of this hypothesis have focused on evidence from Califor-
nia’s CSR program (Kane & Staiger 2005, Jepsen & Rivkin 2009). However,
1Note that not all experimental and quasi-experimental studies find significant class-size
effects (Hoxby 2000). A recent paper by Rockoff (2009) discusses the results of several
class-size experiments from the beginning of the twentieth century and concludes that the
balance of these early class-size experiments suggest there was little achievement benefit to
attending smaller classes. This conclusion comes with several caveats. Most importantly,
it seems plausible that changes in the educational environment since the early twentieth
century may have changed the role of class size in affecting achievement.
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studies of California CSR are limited by the available data. Chief among
these limitations is a lack of linked student-teacher test score data until sev-
eral years after CSR’s introduction (Kane & Staiger 2005). Due to differential
teacher attrition and human capital accumulation, this leaves the short-run
implications of CSR induced hiring unanswered. Furthermore, the linked data
that are available covers only a single district, prohibiting an analysis of het-
erogeneity across districts or the potential for across-district hiring spillovers.
While school aggregated data is available for the period around the intro-
duction of CSR, these data still do not include any pre-policy test measures.
Identification using the school average data also relies on observed teacher
characteristics in order to estimate changes in teacher quality as the data do
not identify new teachers or link students to specific teachers (Jepsen & Rivkin
2009). However, much of the education production function literature finds
that these characteristics play only a small role in explaining the variation in
student achievement (Goldhaber 2008).
Using administrative data on individual students and teachers in grades
four through six from an anonymous state (subsequently referred to as State
X)2 before and after the introduction of a state-wide CSR program, this paper
explores the teacher quality hypothesis in detail, while overcoming the limi-
tations of the prior work. As a starting point, we consider whether there is
any evidence that a CSR-induced decline in teacher quality can explain the
lack of an estimated effect from prior quasi-experimental evaluations of CSR
performance.
We find little evidence to support the idea that the small CSR effects esti-
mated using treatment-control comparisons are due to the quality of incoming
teachers. Comparing schools categorized as treated (those for which CSR was
binding) and control in prior quasi-experimental studies of CSR before and af-
ter the introduction of the policy, we find only a very small difference (≈ 0.15%
of a test score standard deviation) in average student performance attributable
to the quality of hired teachers. In fact, schools classified as treated experi-
2The State X Department of Education has requested the state be kept anonymous for
all publications and presentations as a condition of data access and use.
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ence a slightly smaller drop in achievement attributable to newly hired teachers
than those in the control group. This difference is of the opposite sign needed
to support the teacher quality hypothesis. The estimates account for both
the underlying quality of hiring cohorts and the potential short-run effect of
hiring more teachers with less experience. It is important to note that these
results are quite robust to several estimation approaches that account for many
possible confounding influences including state-wide policy changes or general
state-wide trends in the quality of hired teachers.
Interestingly, the small difference between treated and control groups masks
a flat profile in cohort value-added before CSR followed by a sudden decline
in the quality of teacher hiring cohorts in both treatment and control schools
with the introduction of CSR. While the quality of cohorts may not explain
the small treatment effect estimates of CSR, due to the strong possibility
of treatment spillovers in this setting it may still be the case that teacher
quality and student performance did suffer from CSR, a possibility missed by
any treatment-control evaluation of CSR. Namely, with treatment and control
schools operating in the same labor markets, the increase in teacher demand
from the introduction of CSR may have reduced the quality of new hires even
in the control schools. That is, schools not directly affected by CSR may have
nevertheless hired lower quality teachers due to CSR as potential candidates
were hired by schools forced to reduce class size.
While the general equilibrium nature of these potential hiring spillovers
makes it difficult to completely rule out other possible explanations for the
sudden decline in value-added associated with the CSR induced hiring in-
crease, it is a potentially important effect of CSR that would go unnoticed in
treatment-control comparisons. Further, we do provide some suggestive evi-
dence that the drop in quality with increased hiring was not likely driven by
changes in certification policies or in the financial attractiveness of teaching
in State X that could possible alter the selection into teaching over this time
period.
To examine and quantify the possible state-wide CSR hiring effects, we
trace the evolution of cohort mathematics value-added over time for three
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pre- and five post-policy hiring cohorts.3 The estimates of cohort performance
indicate a modest reduction in the average quality of both newly hired teach-
ers and teachers who are retained after their first year. In terms of student
achievement, the estimated conditional mean performance of the larger (up to
62% larger) post-CSR hiring cohorts ranges from 0.33% to 2.55% test score
standard deviations lower than the smaller pre-CSR cohorts in each cohort’s
first year. This difference is equivalent to 10-15% of the standard deviation in
teacher quality found in our sample.
Furthermore, the impact on individual students assigned to the marginal
teachers may be quite large. Back of the envelope calculations based on in-
dividual teacher value-added suggest that more students, roughly 7% of all
students assigned to a new cohort teacher, were assigned a teacher in the low-
est quintile of the value-added distribution during CSR compared to before
CSR. Given the large differences in mean value-added by quintile of between
25% and 73% of a test score standard deviation, this represents a potentially
large effect for this subset of affected students.
However, the differences in cohort performance only persist partially over
time as the composition of each cohort changes, with the differences in pre- and
post-CSR second year cohort effects ranging from 1.09% to 1.98% standard
deviations. However, there is evidence that further attrition leads to negligible
differences among the remaining teachers after three to four years, implying
a very small long-run CSR hiring effect on achievement. Importantly, the
short-run CSR hiring effects identified here were missed completely by prior
studies.
The results are informative beyond providing a better understanding of
CSR programs. The results help fill a gap in the prior literature on the quality
elasticity of teacher supply. Namely, the intervention studied here provides a
rare opportunity to observe a substantial increase in the number of teachers
hired for the same schools in a short time period. This sort of variation is pre-
ferred to relying on cross-sectional or longer run differences in teacher hiring
3Similar results obtained using reading test scores are presented in an appendix. The
decision to focus on mathematics scores only was made for the sake of brevity.
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to identify this elasticity. An understanding of the nature of the underlying
teacher labor supply is useful for predicting the impact of any intervention
that results in a sudden change in teacher demand. For instance, short-run in-
creases in teacher demand associated with retirement buyout plans or changes
in curriculum are often met with concerns over the quality of the new teachers
hired (Center for Local State and Urban Policy 2010). Additionally, recent
papers have simulated the achievement effects of value-added based retention
policies, the results of which depend critically on the assumptions regarding
the quality elasticity of teacher supply (Goldhaber & Theobald 2011, Boyd
et al. 2011). The results found here are informative in predicting the fall in
quality associated with such policies.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the data used; section
3 discusses the institutional details of the policy and concurrent teacher labor
market conditions; section 4 gives the empirical strategy used and provides the
baseline results and sensitivity checks; section 5 presents further analysis as-
sessing the implications of the baseline estimates for CSR policy performance,
tracing out the long run hiring effects, and characterizing the magnitude of
the effects for students; finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data used for the following analysis will be a combination of restricted-
use state administrative data and State X’s published class-size averages. The
extract of the administrative data available for this study links students in
grades one through six to teachers and schools from the 2000-2001 to the 2007-
2008 school year. Importantly, the students are linked directly to their math
teacher. In other prominent administrative data sets, the student/teacher
match is less clean with students linked to all teachers at the grade level or
to end-of-year exam proctors. In addition to basic student demographics, the
data include mathematics scores for State X’s criterion-referenced high-stakes
test for students from third to sixth grade. These test score data enable the
estimation of teacher value-added for teachers in grades four through six over
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a seven-year period starting with the 2001-2002 school year.
The data track teachers over the same period as students and include an
additional year, beginning with the 1999-2000 school year. This allows teachers
to be followed as long as they stay in the state’s elementary school education
system. For instance, it is possible to identify when teachers enter or exit the
public elementary school system over time. Given that CSR began in the 2003-
2004 school year, this allows us to identify three pre-policy hiring cohorts, five
post policy cohorts, as well as a set of “baseline” teachers hired four or more
years before CSR. The teacher information includes relevant variables such as
a teacher’s experience and degree level. The experience measure used is the
sum of four separate categories that are recorded for each teacher capturing
all prior experience in public and private schools both within State X and in
other states. This encompassing experience measure will be important when
distinguishing between teacher quality and experience effects due to the CSR-
induced hiring.
Finally, State X has made each district/school’s average class size publicly
available since the beginning of the CSR program. These class-size averages
allow for the identification of districts and schools that needed to reduce class
size in order to stay compliant. Importantly, this allows us to match the catego-
rization of treatment and control groups used in prior prior quasi-experimental
CSR policy estimates (Chingos 2012). Descriptive statistics for the key vari-
ables used in this study are presented in Appendix Table 1. Notably, nearly
70% of the student-year observations in the data are linked to a teacher ob-
served entering at some point in the sample period allowing for comparisons
across cohorts.
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3 CSR & the Teacher Labor Market in State
X
3.1 Institutional Details
In November of 2002, State X voters approved a constitutional amendment
that created a state wide CSR program. The program was set to begin in the
2003-2004 school year. Separate class-size maximums were set for different
grade levels, as shown in Table 1. The law established per-pupil allocations
from the state government for each year a district or school was in compliance.
There is anecdotal evidence from board of education meeting transcripts that
this was not enough to cover the full costs of CSR for some districts. This
anecdote suggests that a reallocation of other resources may partially explain
CSR performance. This possibility will be explored in the results section.
The law allowed for a gradual phase-in of the new class sizes. A district
or school was in compliance if it had lowered the average class size by two
students from the previous year or if it was already below the maximum. For
the first three years of the program, the compliance was based on the district
average, while the next three years it was based on a school-level average.
Non-compliance by districts or schools initially resulted in a portion of the
CSR allocation being directed toward capital outlays aimed at reducing class
size. Beginning in the third year of the program, the threatened sanctions for
non-compliance became more severe. According to the law, districts not in
compliance were to be forced to implement one of the following four policies:
having year-round schools, having double sessions in schools, changing school
attendance zones, or altering the use of instructional staff.
As seen in Table 1, the new maximums were binding for most districts at
implementation with only 12% and 42% of districts below the required average
class size in kindergarten through third grade and fourth grade through eighth
grade, respectively. With district-level average class size dropping from 23 to
16 for the earliest grades and from 24 to 19 in the middle grades, it is clear
that the program did achieve the stated goal of reducing class size.
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Table 1: CSR in State X
Grades Maximum Percent Below Max Yr 1 Average CS Yr 1 Average CS Yr 8
KG-G3 18 12% 23 16
G4-G8 22 42% 24 19
G9-G12 25 91% 24 22
3.2 Market for Teachers in State X During CSR
Before analyzing the achievement outcomes associated with CSR and the sub-
sequent teacher hiring in State X, we consider the general state of the teacher
labor market, as well as factors that may have led to changes in the supply
or demand for teachers over the same time period. This analysis is important
for interpreting the results that follow and helps to tie the current work to
the previous CSR literature on changes in the teacher workforce. We begin
with a discussion of trends in teacher numbers and characteristics over the
introduction of CSR.
Figure 1 displays trends in the stock and flow in the number of teachers,
percent with an advanced degree, average experience, and percent with three
or fewer years of experience. Here, we focus on teachers teaching a core course
(those that fall under CSR requirements) in grades four through six (those
for which value-added estimation is possible with our data). Recall that the
data follow all first through sixth grade teachers in public schools in State
X. Therefore, a teacher will be considered part of the flow if they are new
to teaching, returning to teaching, transferring from a public middle or high
school, moving from a private school within the state, or moving from a public
or private school in another state.
In panel A, we see a steady rise in teacher numbers over the introduction
of CSR from under 19,500 before CSR to nearly 24,500 after five years. This
rise is driven in part by an increase in the number of entering teachers from a
pre-CSR average of roughly 4,600 each year to 6,100 during district-level en-
forcement and 6,700 during school-level enforcement of CSR. We also see that
the percentage with an advanced degree among both the stock and inflow falls
with the introduction of CSR and the change to school-level enforcement, while
9
District CSR School CSR
18000
19000
20000
21000
22000
23000
24000
Panel A: Number of Teachers
04000
05000
06000
07000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
YEAR
District CSR School CSR
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Pe
rc
en
t
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
YEAR
Panel B: Advanced Degree
District CSR School CSR
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Ye
ar
s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
YEAR
Panel C: Average Years Experience
District CSR School CSR
32
37
42
47
52
57
62
Pe
rc
en
t
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
YEAR
Panel D: Novice Teachers
Grades 4-6 in Core Courses
Figure 1: Teacher Stock and Flow Trends
 Stock  Flow
Figure 1: Teacher Stock and Flow Trends
10
increasing in the other years.4 Average experience of all teachers drops from a
pre-CSR level of roughly eleven years to nearly 9.5 years by the introduction
of school-level enforcement four years later. Not surprisingly, the percentage
of teachers considered novices, with three or fewer years of experience, also
increased over the implementation of CSR.5
Note in panel C, we see a decline in average experience before the introduc-
tion of CSR. This drop is unlikely to be due to hiring in anticipation of CSR.
Importantly, the amendment was voted on and passed in November of 2002,
after the majority of hiring for the 2002-03 school year would have been com-
pleted. One may worry, however, that this signals a decline in teacher quality
even before the policy is introduced. Importantly, in section 5 we will show
that there is no pre-reform trend in cohort value-added, the main measure
of quality used in this paper. Given the weaker connection between teacher
observables and student achievement in the literature, it is the value-added
trends that are more important as they will capture the unobservable factors
that contribute to student achievement. That said, in the analysis that fol-
lows, we will explicitly control for teacher experience. If experience is a proxy
for other unobserved factors, then this is accounted for and would alter the
interpretation of the estimated experience effects and not the cohort effects.
If, however, the concern is that the slight drop in experience beforehand was
a signal that schools would be forced to move along several margins, including
those not typically correlated with experience, to hire lower quality cohorts
regardless of increased hiring, then our estimated cohort effects are an upper
bound on the magnitude of CSR induced hiring effects on student achieve-
ment. Of course, this story requires the response on these other margins to
4For Advanced Degrees, this occurs during the adjustment to the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001. NCLB placed more emphasis on having teachers with advanced
degrees. As there is a lag for degree completion and it represents a discrete change in status
for individual teachers, we might expect this to be less smooth than measures of experience
that evolve more-or-less continuously over time for individual teachers. Schools may also be
more willing to make trade-offs on the degree level dimension as teachers can be hired with
the expectation that they will complete their masters in a specified time period.
5A more detailed discussion of changes in the observable characteristics of teachers in
State X over CSR implementation based on publicly available school-level data is available
upon request.
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lag behind the experience drop to explain why there is no pre-policy drop in
cohort value-added. We will return to this in discussing the results.
While this descriptive analysis has established a clear link between the
timing of the CSR policy and both an increase in hiring and a drop in average
experience of teachers, there are other concurrent factors worth mentioning. In
terms of the demand for teachers, State X faced a growing student population
that, irrespective of CSR, would require additional teachers. Soon after CSR
adoption, the state projected the hiring needs across all grades and subjects
from CSR and student enrollment growth, as shown in Table 2A. Hiring needs
driven by enrollment growth were projected to be fairly steady, at just over
3,000 each year. At the change to school-level enforcement in 2006-07, the
number of new teachers needed due to CSR was projected to be nearly three
times that from enrollment growth. The difference for the grades studied here
is likely to be even more stark, as the numbers in Table 2A include high school
grades that were relatively unaffected by CSR.
In Table 2B, we show enrollment numbers for grades 4 through 6 (the
grades studied here) in State X from the 1996-97 school year until 2006-07.
While we see steady growth of around 2.5% several years before CSR, there
is actually a decline in enrollment just before CSR and much smaller growth,
around 0.25%, for the first few years of CSR. While the underlying growth
of the student population certainly implies that the stock of teachers was
likely to grow regardless of CSR, due to the relatively flat profile for projected
enrollment growth based hiring in Table 2A and the slowdown in growth for
the grades studied here in Table 2B, it is likely that the sudden increase in the
number of teachers hired shown in Figure 1 was in fact largely due to CSR.6
In the analysis that follows, it is best to think of the results coming from a
situation where CSR has been implemented in a state of growing enrollment
and that CSR policies implemented in times of falling or roughly stable student
numbers may lead to different results. However, it is important to note that
rising student numbers is the reality in many cases and, as such, is not unique
6Note that the trend in actual hiring may have been smoother than the projected numbers
due to preemptive hiring.
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to State X.
Table 2A: Projected Hiring in State X
Year
Hiring Need 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
CSR 4,324 2,378 11,821 974
Enrollment Growth 3,297 3,024 3,134 3,451
Table 2B: Grade 4-6 Enrollment in State X
CSR Year G4-G6 Enrollment Percentage Change
None 1996-97 529815
None 1997-98 539832 1.89%
None 1998-99 552636 2.37%
None 1999-00 567904 2.76%
None 2000-01 583434 2.73%
None 2001-02 597991 2.50%
None 2002-03 585174 -2.14%
District 2003-04 586840 0.28%
District 2004-05 588082 0.21%
District 2005-06 589620 0.26%
School 2006-07 599815 1.73%
Over this time period, the state commonly recruited teachers from other
states to fill teaching needs. If out-of-state teachers are less familiar with the
curriculum and the marginal teachers hired due to CSR were from out-of-
state, any fall in teacher quality may partially reflect this. Once more, this
does not invalidate the results to follow, as such a strategy may be pursued
by any state facing an increase in teacher demand. Simply put, hiring more
out-of-state teachers is one of the margins schools can move along when faced
with CSR. Nevertheless, the administrative data can be used to help assess
the importance of this hypothesis for interpreting the results. While the data
do not include indicators for where a teacher completed their initial educator
training, separate experience measures are recorded for time spent in State
X and in other states. Recall from Panel C of Figure 1 that many entering
teachers in our data have some previous experience, therefore we can look at
entrants separately by the type of experience.
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Figure 2 plots the proportion of entering teachers in our sample that have no
experience, experience in State X, and experience outside of State X.7 We see
the proportion of entrants with out-of-state experience stay roughly level at
about 15%. We do see a rise in the proportion with no experience and a fall in
those with experience in the state. The result is an eroding of a pre-policy gap
of nearly 15 percentage points in favor of hiring teachers with prior in-state
experience. This gap begins to reappear after the 2005-06 school year.
This analysis cannot capture changes in the composition of newly hired
teachers without prior experience. While complete records covering this pe-
riod are not available, one report from the state suggests that of the newly
certified teachers whose certification was based on completion of an approved
preparation program, roughly a quarter were from an out of state program in
the first year of CSR, 2003-04, and another report puts the number at 29%
the following year. As the majority of new hires entered with either prior
experience in State X or were trained in State X, an increase in hiring out-
of-state teachers can play only a small role in interpreting the main results of
this paper.
While other changes in demand serve to inform the interpretation of the
main analysis of this paper, it is concurrent changes in teacher supply that may
directly affect the performance of hiring cohorts that pose the biggest threat to
validity. In particular, we are concerned with potential changes in the selection
into the teaching profession in State X, as well as changes in the training
received by new cohorts. To be clear, these concerns are less important for our
ability to assess the teacher quality hypothesis within the quasi-experimental
setup used to estimate CSR policy effects. As will become apparent later,
any state-wide trends in hiring cohort quality will be explicitly accounted for.
However, when we allow for hiring effects to “spillover” to schools not directly
under CSR pressure, any concurrent changes in the selection into or training
of new cohorts of teachers will affect our ability to attribute changes in quality
7Note that some teachers identified as entering the data will have both in- and out-of-
state experience so the sum across categories in each year can be greater than one.
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to the CSR induced hiring increase.
One concern would be that general labor market changes over time may
alter the choice of entry into teaching. In particular, we consider the financial
attractiveness of the teaching profession relative to alternative occupations in
State X. Following Feng (2009), we use the Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages (QCEW) to calculate the average annual salary in sectors that
teachers are most likely to enter upon leaving teaching.8 Feng finds that the
average salary in these sectors is predictive of teacher exit in State X. Under the
assumption that these opportunity salaries are also important when making an
initial occupation or college major choice, we document the long run changes
in the salary of teachers relative to these outside options in State X. We would
be particularly concerned with a sudden change in the relative attractiveness
of teaching that coincides with either the introduction of CSR or a few years
earlier when new teachers hired during CSR made degree choices.
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the ratio of average teacher salary to the
average opportunity sector salaries. We use the QCEW measured average an-
nual salary in the outside option sectors as the denominator and consider three
different measures of teacher salaries as the numerator. We use the average
annual salary for the Education Sector from the QCEW and the average salary
for teachers with either a bachelors or masters degree as reported by State X.9
For all three measures, we see a general decline in the relative attractiveness of
teaching. However, there is no evidence of a sudden, large change in any of the
salary ratios either just before or at the introduction of CSR.10 Obviously, this
is only suggestive evidence that there were no concurrent changes in the labor
8We use the same set of sectors as Feng: Retail Trade, Information, Finance and In-
surance, Services, and Public Administration. Feng selects these sectors based on survey
responses of exiting teachers in the Schools and Staffing Survey.
9Note that State X has published average salaries for both degree levels in two separate
reports: one covering the period from 1996 to 2006 (the beginning of School-level CSR
enforcement) and one starting in 2002 to the present. The two series differ slightly for the
period of overlap, so we plot both. The QCEW series has the advantage of covering a longer
period with no change in reporting, while the State X reports are a better reflection of what
a teacher might expect, rather than the average for the entire Education sector in State X.
10Formal tests at CSR introduction or up to four years prior do not reject the null of no
jump in relative salary.
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market that would alter the composition of entry cohorts. Two important
caveats are that this does not include other forms of non-salary compensation
and that the observed average salaries are the equilibrium outcome of union
bargaining and individual labor supply decisions.
A further concern is that State X introduced measures to reduce the costs
of entering the teaching profession through alternative certification pathways.
These changes included the authorization of school districts (rather than just
colleges and universities) to provide professional preparation programs for cer-
tification beginning in the 2002-2003 school year and a law in 2004 allowing for
the creation of teacher preparation institutes for college graduates with a non-
education degree to receive certification (Feistritzer 2007). These policies may
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alter both the selection into entry cohorts (lowering entry costs) and the qual-
ity of the training received by entry cohorts (changing the required training).
If these measures led to a change in the labor supply of teachers in CSR years,
part of what is estimated as changes in cohort quality in this paper may be
capturing these changes as well. Fortunately, the uptake of these alternative
pathways was quite low over the period of our data. Sass (2011) documents the
number of teachers in grades three through ten from 2000-2001 to 2006-2007
certified by these two pathways at only 1,679. Clearly, the number of these
alternatively certified teachers in grades four through six will be much lower
and, in the longer run, some substitution from traditional certification may be
expected, suggesting little role for the introduction of these two programs to
be driving the results that follow.
4 Empirical Approach and Baseline Estimates
Our two main goals are to investigate whether there was a drop in entering
teacher quality associated with the increased hiring at the introduction of CSR
and whether any such drop in quality can explain the lack of an estimated
effect of the CSR policy. We start by considering the first question. For now,
this requires us to identify the effect of particular hiring cohorts on student
achievement. Later we will consider the implications for CSR effect estimates
and our ability to tie any such changes to CSR hiring.
The methodology used here follows from the standard value-added ap-
proach to education production function estimation. For the purposes of this
paper, teacher quality will be defined as the contribution teachers make to
student mathematics achievement growth. While it is clear that test scores
are only one facet of a student’s academic growth and that a good teacher may
contribute to other areas such as a child’s social development, the advent of
school accountability programs has positioned test scores as the key measure
used to assess teachers and schools. Indeed, value-added to test scores is a
particularly appropriate metric for assessing why test scores did not increase
more with CSR.
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Here, we outline the basic strategy for identifying changes in teacher qual-
ity. These baseline estimates are presented along with several sensitivity checks
and then our preferred estimates that account for teacher attrition are pre-
sented in section 5. The baseline specification discussed here estimates a sin-
gle cohort value-added effect for each entry cohort. This provides for a more
tractable comparison among the several estimators considered and can be con-
sidered a weighted average of the results that follow and is, therefore, a good
summary measure.11 The intuition presented here for interpreting the results
broadly applies to the other estimates as well. The main strategies used are
based on OLS estimation using student level observations of what will be re-
ferred to as a lag score specification due to the presence of the student’s prior
test score as an explanatory variable:12
Aigjst =ζt + λAigjst−1 +Xigjstβ + Cohortjγ1 + γ2A−igjst−1 + f(Expjt) (4.1)
+ γ3CSigjst + φg + ci + δs + eigjst
where
i, g, j, s, t index student, grade, teacher, school, and year
Aigjst is student i’s test score
ζt are year fixed effects
Aigjst−1 is student i’s prior test score
Xigjst are student demographics
13
Cohortj are teacher cohort indicators
A−igjst−1 is the average prior test score of student i’s classmates
11Consider the simple case of estimating a single cohort effect with no other covariates.
the estimating equation is given by Ai = γDi + ui where Di is an indicator for having a
teacher from a particular cohort. In this simple setting the OLS estimate will be the Wald
Estimator: γˆ = E[Ai|D = 1]− E[Y |D = 0]. Later we will allow for separate cohort effects
by year, effectively splitting the D = 1 group into supgroups denoted by d1 and d2 yielding
the following estimating equation: Ai = γ1d1i + γ2d2i + ui. It is straightforward to show
that our original estimate will be a weighted average of the subgroup effects: γˆ = γ1Pr(d1 =
1|D = 1) + γ2Pr(d2 = 1|D = 1)
12See Appendix B: Measuring Teacher Quality for a discussion of value-added estimation.
13The student controls include indicators for race, gender, disability status, free or reduced
price lunch status, limited English proficiency, being foreign born, as well as the student’s
age and the number of days present and absent the prior year.
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f(Expjt) is a cubic in teacher experience
CSigjst is a proxy measure of class size
14
φg are grade fixed effects
ci is an unobserved student heterogeneity term
δs are school fixed effects
Note that OLS estimation of (4.1) (our preferred strategy) ignores ci. While
this assumption may appear strong, there is evidence that OLS estimation
of the lag score specification typically performs well. Using simulated data,
Guarino et al. (2015) find that the lag score specification estimated by OLS
is fairly robust, compared to other common value-added estimators, to dif-
ferent teacher and student sorting mechanisms. Kane & Staiger (2008) find
that this method does the best at estimating a teacher’s value-added in non-
experimental settings by comparing estimates for the same teachers both with
and without random assignment to students. The intuition for this result is
that assignment is driven more by dynamic (i.e. changes in test performance),
rather than static, characteristics of students. Estimators that attempt to
eliminate unobserved student heterogeneity introduce additional assumptions
and greatly reduce the identifying variation, while failing to capture much of
the assignment mechanism that threatens the validity of the estimates. The
presence of ci only threatens the consistency of our results if student-teacher
assignment decisions are made in such a way to induce a correlation between
the time-constant student heterogeneity and the hiring year of a student’s
teacher. In exploring the sensitivity of the results below, we will argue that
14Class size is measured by the number of students linked to a teacher in a given year
in the test data. While this serves as a reasonable proxy in fourth and fifth grade, it is
less reliable in sixth grade when many schools have teachers teaching multiple classes. In
estimating (4.1) we allow for different effects of class size for each grade. The proxy measure
of class size is important for separating out the quality of newly hired teachers from any
effect the reduced class sizes may have had on achievement under CSR. Importantly, there is
sufficient within cohort and within year variation in class size to separately identify the class
size and cohort effects. Due to the potential for biased class size effects from measurement
error, we conducted an exercise in which we estimated our main specification constraining
the effect of class size at different plausible values yielding qualitatively similar results for
our cohort effect estimates. Results are available upon request.
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such assignment policies are unlikely in practice.
The main coefficients of interest are the estimates of γ1, the average quality
of entry cohorts of teachers. Specifically, interest lies in comparing the average
quality of cohorts hired before and after the introduction of CSR. The teacher-
quality explanation for the poor performance of CSR would be consistent
with smaller gains associated with cohorts entering the data after CSR was
implemented compared to earlier cohorts.
The inclusion of δs, the school fixed effects, is important for two reasons.
First, it helps to control for differences across schools in student ability. The
school fixed effects are also critical to identify whether schools hired teachers
of lower quality in CSR years. Given evidence that there is strong sorting of
teachers into geographically small markets (Boyd et al. 2005; Lankford et al.
2002), schools may face different levels of average quality. For now, assume
there was no change in the quality of teachers hired by particular schools, but
that CSR disproportionately induced hiring in schools that faced supplies of
lower quality teachers. In this scenario, without controlling for these school
level differences we would identify a negative relationship between CSR years
and the average quality of new entrants. The school fixed effects control for
the time-invariant quality level of teacher supply that different schools face
by relying on within school comparisons of teachers. We also consider an
alternative approach that relies on within school-grade-year variation.
The experience profile captures three distinct factors: teaching-specific hu-
man capital, non-random assignment of students to teachers based on expe-
rience, and non-random attrition of teachers. Focusing on the human capital
piece, the possible effect of CSR on short-run achievement is better captured
when the experience of the teacher is not controlled for. However, controlling
for experience allows for a more direct comparison of teacher quality through-
out the sample period. If experience is not controlled for, teachers from earlier
cohorts may look better than later cohorts simply because the estimates are
partially based on years in which these teachers have more experience than
later cohorts. The joint contribution of both cohort quality and experience to
student achievement is considered in Appendix F.
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As we noted at the end of section 3, care should be taken in interpreting
the estimates of equation (4.1) as identifying CSR induced hiring effects. Note,
however, that changes that affect all students or teachers in a particular year,
such as changes in curriculum, will be controlled for by the inclusion of the year
fixed effects, ζt. Here the main concerns are factors that alter the performance
of students with teachers hired in a particular year (i.e. that affect only the
students with a teacher hired in 2003-04 but not 2002-03) and are therefore
captured in the estimates of γ1. As mentioned in the previous section, there is
suggestive evidence that two first order concerns, the expansion of alternative
certification pathways and concurrent changes in the financial attractiveness
of teaching relative to other occupations in State X, are not driving changes
in estimated cohort quality.
The approach used here captures potential CSR effects that would be diffi-
cult to identify given the available data. For example, the school-level class-size
averages within enforcement grade groups are only available starting with the
year directly before school-level enforcement.15 This data limitation makes it
difficult to identify schools that may have hired teachers during district-level
enforcement years in order to preempt the switch to school-level enforcement.
The estimates of γ1 for the 2005-2006 hiring cohort will include the effect of
schools hiring additional teachers because of the switch in enforcement the
following year.
Note that these value-added measures may also capture changes in re-
sources that complement a teacher’s ability to raise achievement. If CSR led
to a reduction in these resources available to newly hired teachers (relative
to teachers from earlier hiring cohorts), then part of the change in measured
cohort effectiveness over time may be capturing these changes as well. We
suspect, however, that many of these changes in resources will apply to all
15While the state does have records of average class size at the school level for several
years prior to CSR, these are not separated by the enforcement grades. Since many of the
schools studied here include grades in both the K-3 and 4-8 enforcement groupings, it is
difficult to create a comparable measure of average class-size that is directly related to CSR
enforcement. Furthermore, these other class-size records are based on student counts in
October, while the CSR enforcement averages are based on counts made in February.
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teachers in a particular school and year, both in new and old cohorts. There-
fore, we can compare the performance for teachers hired in different years, but
teaching in the same schools at the same time to test whether such changes
are driving the results. In the end we find evidence that this is not the case.
Table 3 presents the baseline estimates of the cohort effects (γ1) from equa-
tion (4.1) in the first column.16 The policy-relevant comparison is between
pre-CSR and post-CSR cohorts. We use the convention of shading district
CSR enforcement years in light gray and school CSR enforcement years in
dark gray. For reference, the initial cohort size is also presented. All speci-
fications are estimated using developmental scale test scores that have been
standardized within grade and year.
The results show that students with teachers who entered during CSR
perform worse on average. For instance, students of teachers from the 2006-
2007 cohort are estimated to score, on average, over one-fiftieth of a standard
deviation (0.0317-0.0088=0.0229; p-value=0.000)17 worse than students with
a 2002-2003 cohort teacher. Note, in each case, the estimated cohort effects
are relative to the set of teachers already teaching in State X in the 1999-
2000 school year (hired in or before 1999) and represent the conditional mean
performance of students across all years for a given cohort. We will return to
this in more detail in section 5, however, the slight drop in cohort value-added
before the introduction of CSR is driven by having fewer years of data for each
successive cohort coupled with nonrandom attrition over time of the lowest
performers. When we account for attrition in Section 5, the first year effects
for pre-CSR cohorts are nearly identical. Overall, the estimated post-CSR
cohort effects range from 0.0069 (p-value=0.147) to 0.0360 (p-value=0.000)
standard deviations lower than the two pre-CSR cohorts.18
In addition to the baseline estimates, we consider three main sensitivity
16See Appendix Table 2 for other estimates from this regression and Appendix Table 3
for results using Reading test scores.
17Throughout we will present p-values for tests that two particular cohort values are the
same.
18All pre- post-CSR cohort comparisons are statistically significant at the 5% level except
the comparison between the 2002-2003 cohort and the 2003-2004 cohort.
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Table 3: Baseline Cohort Effect Estimates and Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prior Score Lag Gain Gain Lag Lag Gain
Estimator OLS FE FE FDIV OLS OLS
Entry Cohort
2000-2001 0.0043 0.0061 0.0084 0.0071** 0.0050 0.0102
N=3957 (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0118)
2001-2002 -0.0027 0.0038 0.0003 0.0031 -0.0026 0.0018
N=3023 (0.0033) (0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0195)
2002-2003 -0.0088*** -0.0135** -0.0097 -0.0146*** -0.0096*** -0.0070
N=3171 (0.0025) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0134)
2003-2004 -0.0157*** -0.0267*** -0.0206** -0.0241*** -0.0143*** -0.0203
N=3719 (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0082) (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0127)
2004-2005 -0.0217*** -0.0360*** -0.0319*** -0.0298*** -0.0193*** -0.0265**
N=4497 (0.0045) (0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0137)
2005-2006 -0.0301*** -0.0438*** -0.0432*** -0.0382*** -0.0250*** -0.0484***
N=4714 (0.0024) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0140)
2006-2007 -0.0317*** -0.0431*** -0.0409*** -0.0391*** -0.0290*** -0.0395**
N=4882 (0.0045) (0.0100) (0.0082) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0150)
2007-2008 -0.0264*** -0.0164* -0.0151** -0.0243*** -0.0239*** -0.0244*
N=4463 (0.0047) (0.0092) (0.0074) (0.0049) (0.0039) (0.0147)
Fixed Effects
Student No Yes Yes Yes No No
School Yes No Yes No No No
Grade Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
School-Grade-Year No No No No Yes No
Student-School No No No No No Yes
Observations 2,752,060 2,752,060 2,752,060 1,329,658 2,752,060 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.653 0.399 0.412 – 0.674 0.668
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
checks.19 First, we address the unobserved heterogeneity term (ci) found in
equation (4.1). We consider two ways to control for ci. First, we use the fixed
effects (FE) estimator that can be obtained by OLS on the within-student
time-demeaned data. Importantly, the FE estimator is inconsistent when
lagged dependent variables are included as explanatory variables. Instead
we control for prior achievement by using the test score gain as the dependent
variable (fixing λ = 1 in (4.1)).20 Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 display cohort
effects estimated by FE both excluding and including the school fixed effects,
respectively.21 We also consider a 2SLS version of the Arellano & Bond (1991)
19In Appendix E we also disaggregate the cohort effects by CSR pressure, finding no clear
pattern consistent with schools facing more pressure hiring lower quality teachers. This is
also consistent with the results in section 5.
20Note that the choice of the gain score or lag score estimating equation is of little con-
sequence here, with OLS estimates producing nearly identical cohort effect estimates.
21Controlling for student and school fixed effects simultaneously relies on the presence of
sufficient school-switching among students, as such, we consider estimates both with and
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dynamic GMM estimator, referred to as the First Differenced Instrumental
Variables (FDIV) estimator, in order to address the presence of ci while not
constraining λ = 1.22
Comparing columns (1) through (4) of Table 3 shows that each estimator
leads to the conclusion that the post-CSR cohorts have lower value-added
than the pre-CSR cohorts. For instance, comparing the estimated difference
between the 2002-2003 and 2006-2007 cohorts, all estimators suggest similar
magnitudes of this effect with the largest being in column (3).
Given concerns over the role unobserved student ability may play in esti-
mating education production functions, it may be surprising that the methods
used to address unobserved heterogeneity (FE and FDIV) yield similar results
to those that do not. As was alluded to before, the unobserved heterogeneity
threatens the consistency of the estimates if schools were using a static un-
observed characteristic of students to determine whether a student would be
taught by a teacher hired in a particular year. It seems reasonable, particu-
larly when controlling for teacher experience, that schools were not engaging
in this sort of non-random assignment. While it may certainly be the case
that student achievement is affected by a student’s innate ability and that
this ability is used by schools in making some decisions, it does not appear to
be used in a way that would lead to inconsistencies in our main estimates.
For our second sensitivity check, we replace the separate school (δs), grade
(φg), and year (ζt) effects with a single school-by-grade-by-year fixed effect.
As a thought experiment, the baseline estimates identify each cohort effect
using within school comparisons of student performance in classes taught by
teachers hired in different years while flexibly controlling for state-wide time
trends and time constant differences across grades in average achievement.
This leaves the potential for other factors particular to a school in a given year
(change in leadership) or grade (pedagogical approach) to affect our estimates.
To generate problems, these factors must be related to the student-teacher as-
without the school effects.
22Note that the sample size is decreased substantially for the FDIV estimator as the
requirement of a twice lagged score leaves only students with three consecutive test scores
in the estimation sample thereby excluding all fourth grade students.
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signment decision in such a way to induce a correlation between the cohort
indicators and the unobserved factors even after controlling for the other co-
variates. In contrast, the estimates when including the school-by-grade-by-
year fixed effects effectively control for any unobserved factors particular to
a given school-grade-year that may affect student achievement. In fact, this
would include school-grade-year factors related to CSR implementation, such
as splitting up classes or altering the use of building space, that on average
affect classes taught by all cohorts of teachers. This added flexibility comes at
the cost of relying on within school-grade-year comparisons in order to identify
the cohort effects. That is, school-grade-year observations only contribute to
the estimation of a particular cohort effect if there is at least one teacher from
that cohort and one from another cohort teaching in that school-grade-year.23
Column (5) displays the cohort effect estimates when including school-by-
grade-by-year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (5) show very similar pre-CSR
cohort effects, while the absolute value of the post-CSR effects are slightly
smaller in magnitude. However, this slight change does not alter the conclusion
that post-CSR cohorts tend to have lower value-added than pre-CSR cohorts.24
One final sensitivity check concerns the movement of students to new
schools in response to CSR. If there are student-school match effects (i.e.
some schools better suit a particular student’s learning needs) and if CSR in-
creased transitions between schools due to capacity constraints, then students
may be forced to move to a school with different match quality. One might
worry that match quality will tend to be higher on average in the pre-CSR
“unconstrained” school choice than in the post-CSR “constrained” match. In
this case, the previous estimates may partially be capturing the associated re-
duction in student-school match quality, rather than a drop in teacher quality.
23Omitting the school fixed effects entirely and including school characteristics identifies
the cohort effects by comparing teachers across schools as well. While this may increase
the number of comparisons that contribute to identification, such an approach is the most
susceptible to omitted variables bias as outlined above. Here, this approach leads to a
similar conclusion that students in post-CSR cohort classes perform worse.
24The results are also invariant to the many potential combinations of year, grade, school,
school-year, school-grade, and grade-year effects that could be included in the model. See
Appendix Table 4 for these results.
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To address this possibility, in column (6) we present results with student-by-
school fixed effects. Once again the general trend of lower quality in the larger
post-CSR cohorts persists, although the standard errors are noticeably larger.
Motivated by these results and the prior literature discussed above, through-
out the remainder of the paper we will estimate variants of (4.1) by OLS
controlling for separate grade, year, and school effects.
Note that the comparison among the estimated cohort effects does not fully
capture the contribution of these teachers to average state-wide achievement.
In particular, this comparison misses the fact that not all students in CSR
years are taught by teachers hired in post-CSR cohorts and that the average
experience in the state dropped in post-CSR years. In Appendix F, we show
that the cohort and experience profile estimates suggest an overall decline in
average student performance of 0.0154 standard deviations. The drop is shown
to be driven predominately by cohort quality rather than experience effects.
5 Further Analysis: CSR Performance, Long
Run Effects, and Distributional Effects
5.1 Entering Teacher Quality and CSR Performance Es-
timates
Prior research found no evidence of CSR policy effects in State X using treatment-
control comparisons with schools with average class size above the new max-
imums considered treated while those below were the control group. In Ap-
pendix C, we confirm these previous results using our sample and methods.
We now consider whether the lack of a CSR effect in the prior literature can
be attributed to a CSR hiring induced fall in teacher quality. To do so, we
modify equation (4.1) by interacting a CSR District treatment dummy vari-
able with all included regressors allowing for separate cohort effects in treated
and control schools.
We find little difference in the estimated cohort effects across the two sets
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of schools. Our focus here is on the implied contribution of new teacher hiring
to average student achievement in treatment and control schools. That is,
we want to directly address the teacher quality hypothesis in relation to the
prior quasi-experimental estimates of CSR performance that have been used
to conclude that CSR was ineffective. To do so, we need to consider both
the differences in cohort quality and the rise in the number of inexperienced
teachers associated with the introduction of CSR documented in section 3.
The estimated contribution to average achievement in both treatment and
control schools (j = T,C) of the cohort composition are calculated in each year
as COHORT jtγˆ1j. This effectively weights the cohort effects by the proportion
of students with teachers from each cohort in treatment or control schools in
each year. Similarly, we estimate the experience contribution in both sets of
schools by fˆ(EXPjt).
Table 4 displays the evolution of the total contribution (cohort composi-
tion plus experience) of teachers to average performance separately for schools
considered treated and untreated. Table 4 also shows the difference in these
changes between treated and untreated schools. Column six is of particu-
lar interest as it relates to the type of comparison used to estimate CSR
policy effects. Specifically, prior studies rely on treatment-control compar-
isons (Difference-in-difference (DinD), Comparative Interrupted Time Series,
or other related estimators) to estimate CSR effects. Loosely speaking, in-
stead of examining the DinD of student achievement as in the prior work, here
we consider the DinD of the portion of student achievement attributable to
teacher cohorts and experience. Both treated and untreated schools experience
a drop in the teachers’ contribution to average achievement. Interestingly, the
CSR schools saw a slightly smaller drop, the largest difference being 0.0015
test score standard deviations in 2005-2006, than those schools for which CSR
was not binding at introduction. This estimate is small relative to the unre-
alized CSR achievement gains and, most importantly, is of the opposite sign
needed to explain the finding of no achievement gain from CSR.
While we find no evidence of a differential change in teacher quality for the
treatment and control schools, the fact that the schools saw similar declines
28
Table 4: Estimated Total Contribution to Average Achievement: Treatment vs. Control Schools
Total Achievement Contribution Change from 2001-2002
Year Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
2001-2002 0.0380*** 0.0388*** -0.0008*** - - -
(0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0002) - - -
2002-2003 0.0367*** 0.0369*** -0.0002 -0.0013** -0.0019** 0.0006
(0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004)
2003-2004 0.0343*** 0.0347*** -0.0004* -0.0038*** -0.0041*** 0.0004**
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0002)
2004-2005 0.0331*** 0.0336*** -0.0005** -0.0049*** -0.0053*** 0.0003***
(0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0001)
2005-2006 0.0293*** 0.0282*** 0.0011*** -0.0087*** -0.0106*** 0.0019***
(0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0003)
2006-2007 0.0234*** 0.0227*** 0.0007*** -0.0146*** -0.0161*** 0.0015***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0002)
2007-2008 0.0209** 0.0202** 0.0007*** -0.0171*** -0.0186*** 0.0015***
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0002) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0002)
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in achievement attributable to the teacher stock post-CSR is potentially inter-
esting. An important question that emerges is whether this general decline in
cohort quality during CSR implementation can be attributed to the CSR in-
duced hiring increase. It seems reasonable that while only some schools faced
direct pressure to increase hiring to reduce class size, all schools in an area may
be affected. By hiring teachers in the same market, the CSR-induced demand
shift would force all schools along the effective labor supply curve to hire lower
quality teachers. That is, the effects of CSR on teacher quality may “spillover”
to schools that were not under pressure to reduce class size, but were hiring
teachers for other reasons. In this way, the general decline could still be the
result of CSR. Furthermore, it would go unnoticed in any treatment-control
comparison of CSR.
We readily acknowledge that there may be a number of alternative explana-
tions for the concurrent decline in cohort quality, however the set of plausible
explanations is limited in a few ways. Alternative explanations should be con-
sistent with the key patterns in Table 4: similar relative new teacher quality
in treatment and control schools before CSR followed by a similar decline in
new teacher quality for both sets of schools. Again, these patterns are ev-
ident after controlling for time constant school factors and statewide trends
captured by the school and year fixed effects, respectively, and are robust to
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a number of alternative estimation approaches. Any alternative explanation
must also be related to the quality of teachers hired in post-CSR years relative
to earlier cohorts and not just the performance of all teachers post-CSR more
generally. That is, potential factors must disproportionately impact new hires
or the students in classes taught by new hires in order to explain the general
decline in new hire quality.
Therefore, our primary concern are changes in the composition of entering
teachers that may be driven by changes in both the selection into teaching and
the training received. In section 3, we discussed changes in certification policy
and the financial attractiveness of teaching in State X. The low take up rates
of the new certification policies make it unlikely that the decline comes from
either a change in selection (due to lower entry costs) or training (allowing
teachers with alternative training backgrounds) from these policies. We also
found no direct evidence of a sudden break in trend for the relative financial
attractiveness of teaching in State X that could directly spur a change in
composition of entry cohorts.
Ultimately, there may be other undocumented changes being captured by
the cohort effect estimates. Unfortunately, the “general equilibrium” nature
of the potential hiring spillovers due to the CSR induced hiring increase make
it difficult to completely account for other factors through common quasi-
experimental techniques that estimate treatment effects for only a subset of
the population.
Further, any difference-in-difference type approach would require identi-
fying a control state that can be used to approximate the change in teacher
quality that State X would have experienced in the absence of CSR. However,
given nontrivial differences in test content and scaling, educational institu-
tions, policy adoption, and general economic factors coupled with the finding
that teachers tend to focus job search in small geographic areas makes finding
a credible control state extremely difficult. This issue is compounded by the
practical fact that we are limited to a small set of states that have comparable
linked student-teacher data over the same time period. Indeed, an exploratory
analysis of publicly available state-wide data from North Carolina, a state that
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does have similar data to State X over this time period, found large differ-
ences in the characteristics of incoming teachers between the two states. For
instance, incoming teachers in North Carolina were, on average, nearly twenty
percentage points more likely to have no prior experience over this time pe-
riod than incoming teachers in our sample over the same time period.25 While
this does not tell us about value-added differences between the two states, it
does suggest that North Carolina may not be a clean “control” state when
considering the labor market for teachers in State X.
Nonetheless, given the plausible connection between the increased hiring
due to CSR and the fall in cohort quality, it is important to consider the extent
of the potential effect in more detail. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper
we explore this general trend toward lower quality cohorts. In particular we
wish to document the potential magnitude of the effect by considering the
long run effect on teacher quality and to move from cohort effect summary
measures to consider the impact for individual students.
5.2 Long Run Hiring Effects
The estimates above combine the initial performance level for a cohort with
the longer-term impact of that cohort as the composition changes. With non-
random attrition, having a single cohort indicator for the 2001-2002 cohort
will disproportionately weight the estimates toward the teachers that stay in
the data longer. Conversely, the estimated 2007-2008 cohort effect roughly
weights each teacher evenly, regardless of their eventual attachment, giving an
estimate of the initial performance.
To address whether the CSR induced demand increase led to both the hir-
ing and retention of lower value-added teachers, as well as the possibility that
attrition from teaching led to different long-term cohort effects, the cohort-
25See Appendix G
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Table 5: Pooled OLS Cohort-by-Year Estimates
Specification Cohort-by-Year
Equation (5.1)
Year 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
Entry Cohort
2000-2001 -0.0135** 0.0004 0.0009 -0.0039 0.0068 0.0069 0.0044
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0060)
N 2764 2419 2091 1965 1795 1608 1479
2001-2002 -0.0441*** -0.0173*** 0.0024 0.0014 0.0103* 0.0102 0.0112*
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0057)
N 3023 2119 1741 1645 1452 1308 1179
2002-2003 -0.0455*** -0.0117*** -0.0126* 0.0015 0.0113 -0.0047
(0.0053) (0.0039) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0079) (0.0057)
N 3171 2131 1858 1636 1440 1323
2003-2004 -0.0488*** -0.0315*** -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0079
(0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0066)
N 3719 2635 2219 2002 1817
2004-2005 -0.0696*** -0.0244*** -0.0081 0.00034
(0.0072) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0055)
N 4497 3132 2626 2261
2005-2006 -0.0632*** -0.0291*** -0.0196***
(0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0047)
N 4714 3188 2684
2006-2007 -0.0670*** -0.0260***
(0.0039) (0.0058)
N 4882 3340
2007-2008 -0.0580***
(0.0054)
N 4463
Observations 2,752,060
R-squared 0.653
District Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
specific indicators in (4.1) are replaced with cohort-by-year indicators:
Aigjst =ζt + λAigjst−1 +Xigjstβ + Cohort× Y earjtγ1 + γ2A−igjst−1+ (5.1)
f(Expjt) + γ3CSigjst + φg + ci + δs + eigjst
Table 5 displays the estimates of equation (5.1). To interpret the table, we
begin along the diagonal with each cohort’s first year effect, following year-
by-year along the row. For instance, the 2005-2006 cohort has an estimated
effect of -6.32% of a test score standard deviation in their first year (cohort
size=4,714), -2.91% in their second year (cohort size=3188), and -1.96% in
their third year (cohort size=2684). While the initial productivity of the ear-
lier cohorts is lower than the previous estimates would suggest, the relative
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performance of cohorts in their first years is essentially unchanged from the
previous estimates with post-CSR cohorts having average achievement 0.0033
(p-value=0.558) to 0.0255 (p-value=0.004) standard deviations below the pre-
CSR cohorts.26 Note that for the 2000-01 hiring cohort, the first estimate
shown is from 2001-02, their second year. The point estimates suggest the
relative performance gap between pre-CSR and post-CSR cohorts is between
0.0109 (p-value=.330) and 0.0198 (p-value=0.003) standard deviations in each
cohort’s second year. Importantly some, but not all, second year cohort effects
are statistically different at conventional levels.27
Also note that pre-CSR cohorts become comparable to the baseline teachers
after three or four years with year-specific cohort effects statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. The two post-CSR cohorts observed for at least four
years, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, also appear to level off to be roughly compa-
rable to the baseline after four years. This result suggests that the potential
long-run CSR hiring effects may be even smaller than those initially observed.
However, the largest post-CSR hiring cohorts are not observed long enough to
make a complete comparison across all cohorts. In particular, the estimated
third-year effect for the 2005-2006 cohort is still statistically different from
zero, at nearly one-fiftieth of a standard deviation.
It is important to note that there is sufficient within cohort variation in
initial experience (particularly for the baseline group) to still control for teacher
experience. This implies that the observed improvement for cohorts is not
reflecting human capital accumulation that is common to all cohorts. However,
it may still be the case that the cohort-by-year effects capture deviations from
the average experience profile that are unique to each cohort. That is, post-
CSR cohorts may be initially lower performing and have smaller than average
improvements with experience.
26First year cohort differences that are not statistically significant at the 10% level include
2001-2002 to 2003-2004 (p-value=0.539), 2002-2003 to 2003-2004 (p-value=0.558), and 2002-
2003 to 2007-2008 (p-value=0.104).
27Second year cohort differences that are not statistically significant at the 10% level
include 2000-2001 to 2004-2005 (p-value=0.250), 2000-2001 to 2006-2007 (p-value=0.136),
2001-2002 to 2004-2005 (p-value=0.330), and 2001-2002 to 2006-2007 (p-value=0.227)
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The fact that post-CSR cohorts perform worse in their second years sug-
gests that not only may schools be initially hiring lower value-added teachers
due to the CSR-induced demand increase, but the schools may be retain-
ing more low value-added teachers longer in order to meet CSR requirements.
State X is notable for dismissing teachers within their first three years for poor
performance at a much higher rate than the nation as a whole, with the state’s
ninety-seven day probationary rule cited as a possible explanation. However,
these results suggest that the short run CSR demand increase may have weak-
ened this mechanism for ensuring quality instruction. Both phenomenon, the
hiring and retention of lower value-added teachers, fit nicely within the frame-
work of a simple search model of teacher hiring in which teachers are effectively
viewed as experience goods (see Rockoff & Staiger 2010). However, it appears
that the long-run achievement effect of these changes may be relatively small.
A comparison across cohorts within the same year lends some insight into
the role other inputs into the education process may have had in affecting
student performance over this time. In particular, the effect of unmeasured
changes in classroom inputs directly complementary to teaching may be in-
cluded in the cohort effect estimates. Recall that there is some anecdotal
evidence that State X’s CSR program was not fully funded, raising the possi-
bility that a reallocation of other inputs may have coincided with the hiring
increase studied here. However, since all teachers likely face similar resources
within schools in a given year, the fact that the earlier cohorts perform no-
ticeably better in each year suggests that it is not changes in these other com-
plementary inputs driving the results. For instance, in the 2004-2005 school
year the 2002-2003 cohort has an estimated cohort effect over one-twentieth
(0.0696-0.0126=0.0570; p-value=0.000) of a standard deviation better than
the 2004-2005 cohort. This is a practically and statistically significant differ-
ence in performance that is likely not due exclusively to differences in other
classroom-level inputs.
The results found here are consistent with the notion that increased teacher
hiring is associated with a modest short-run decrease in quality. For instance,
the introduction of a value-added based retention policy may indeed increase
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hiring and reduce new hire quality, partially offsetting the potential gains from
the policy. However, it is possible that there remain uncontrolled for trends in
cohort quality driving the result. This serves as an important caveat for con-
sidering the implications for teacher hiring more generally. Recall from section
3 however, that the most obvious policy reason for such a trend, the introduc-
tion of new certification pathways, likely had little affect on the composition
of teachers during this time. We also documented the fact that there was
no sudden contemporaneous, or appropriately lagged, change in the relative
financial attractiveness of teaching in State X over this time period.
Importantly, while we saw a pre-policy decline in teacher experience in sec-
tion 3, Table 5 shows no pre-policy trend in cohort value-added with pre-policy
cohorts performing similarly in the first and second years with first year effects
by cohort of -0.0441 [2001-02] and -0.0455 [2002-03] and second year effects
of -0.0135 [2000-01], -0.0173 [2001-2002], and -0.0117 [2002-03]. This suggests
that there was no pre-policy trend toward hiring lower quality cohorts, lend-
ing some support for the idea that the drop in quality we document post-CSR
might be due to the associated hiring increase. Recall from section 3, if the
pre-CSR drop in experience was an indication that schools would be forced
to move along several unobserved margins typically not correlated with expe-
rience to hire lower quality teachers in the coming years, than our estimates
serve as an upperbound for the CSR induced hiring effect.
Furthermore, as we showed earlier, a general trend toward lower quality
cohorts does not affect the evaluation of CSR in light of the teacher quality
hypothesis. In short, any general trend in cohort quality differenced out when
comparing schools under different CSR pressure. Finally, note once more that
any policy change that affects all students or teachers in a given year, grade,
or school are controlled for by the included fixed effects.
5.3 Discussion of Hiring Effects
The cohort effect estimates presented above suggest a short run drop in stu-
dent performance associated with the larger post-CSR hiring cohorts. It is
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important to consider the magnitude of these effects in interpreting the poten-
tial achievement impact on students of increased hiring. Our estimates suggest
that the post-CSR hiring cohorts have students who perform as much as 2.55%
of a test score standard deviation worse on average in the cohort’s first year
compared to the smaller pre-CSR cohorts. Relative to many other education
production function estimates, these average effects may seem small. Indeed,
they are much smaller than the Tennessee STAR class size effect estimates
mentioned earlier of roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation for an average
reduction of eight students.
To provide a benchmark for evaluating the size of the cohort effect dif-
ferences, we estimate individual teacher value-added by replacing the cohort
indicators with dummy variables for each teacher yielding a distribution of
teacher value-added.28 We find that the standard deviation of teacher value-
added in our sample is 27.61% of a test score standard deviation. Therefore,
a difference in mean cohort quality of 2.55% of a test score standard deviation
is nearly 10% of the standard deviation of the teacher quality distribution.
Note, the standard deviation of 27.61% has not been adjusted for noise due
to small samples for some teachers. As an alternative, we also estimate the
standard deviation of the teacher effects using a mixed effects framework with
teacher and school random effects replacing the fixed effects in order to account
for sampling noise in the individual teacher effect estimates.29 Using this ap-
proach, the estimated standard deviation is 17.14%, implying an even larger
relative effect of the post-CSR hiring cohorts of nearly 15% Viewed in this
light, the estimated cohort effects represent a modest decline in performance.
While focusing on mean cohort effects was instructive for considering the
role hiring quality played in prior quasi-experimental estimates and for provid-
ing a clear summary of the overall effects, it may miss large effects for those
28Appendix D provides a more detailed analysis of the individual value-added results that
closely mirrors the results for the mean cohort effects.
29This is an alternative, but related, approach for handling sampling noise to the “ad-
justed” standard deviations used in Rothstein (2010) or Koedel & Betts (2011). Here,
the adjustment procedure found in these prior papers is computationally intense given our
sample size as it requires standard errors for the individual teacher effects.
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students assigned to the marginal teachers hired due to CSR. To provide a
better sense of the effect CSR hiring may have had on individual students, we
divide the new hire teachers into quintiles based on the estimated value-added
distribution in pre-CSR years for new hires in grades four and five.30 To pro-
vide a reference for the importance of being assigned a teacher in different
quintiles, Table 6 displays the mean value-added across all entering (both pre-
and post-CSR) teachers by quintile in column (2). We see a large difference
across groups, with a mean effect at the low end of -40.74% of a test score
standard deviation while the highest quintile is 32.75%. This represents a
large difference in teacher quality for students assigned to teachers in different
quintiles.31
To provide a measure of the distributional effects, we calculate the number
of students assigned to a teacher in each quintile for each hiring cohort in their
first year. We focus on the first year for each cohort to capture the number
of affected students before any teacher attrition occurs. Note, this means we
are focusing only on the sub-population of students who receive a teacher that
was part of an incoming cohort in that particular year.
Table 6 shows the average across years by quintile separately for the pre-
and post-CSR cohorts, as well as the difference between the two groups. To
account for the fact that post-CSR cohorts taught more students in their first
year, we present a counterfactual distribution of student counts for the pre-
CSR cohorts by scaling up the student numbers to match the post-CSR total
(multiplying by 53381/39797=1.34). The counterfactual numbers roughly re-
flect the predicted number of students exposed to incoming teachers from each
quintile in post-CSR years if the teachers had been drawn from the pre-CSR
new hire quality distribution. Of particular interest is the difference between
the actual post-CSR numbers and the counterfactual pre-CSR numbers. To
30We focus on grades four and five here since comparisons based on teacher value-added
and student numbers are complicated in grade six by the fact that some schools maintain a
system with a single teacher for all subjects (the norm in grades four and five) while others
have subject specific teachers.
31Interestingly the unadjusted standard deviation of first year teacher value added is
remarkably stable by cohort, always between 0.28 and 0.30.
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help provide a sense of scale, we also present the same information as a per-
centage of the students who were assigned an incoming teacher. For reference,
Table 6 also presents similar statistics for the average number and percentage
of teachers from each quintile before and after CSR with the counterfactual
numbers scaled by the rise in the average fourth and fifth grade teacher cohort
(3109/2174=1.43).
Table 6: Average Number of Students and Teachers by Pre-CSR Value-added Quintile: G4-G5
Pre-CSR Cohorts Post-CSR Cohorts Difference
Student
Numbers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Quintile
Mean
Value-added
Actual
Count
Actual
Percent
Counterfactual
Count
Actual
Count
Actual
Percent
Actual
Count
(5)-(2)
Actual
Percent
(6)-(3)
Counterfactual
Count
(5)-(4)
1 -0.4074 7294 18.33% 9784 13652 25.57% 6358 7.25% 3868
2 -0.1507 8041 20.20% 10785 11236 21.05% 3195 0.84% 451
3 -0.0261 8129 20.43% 10904 9917 18.58% 1788 -1.85% -987
4 0.0966 8259 20.75% 11078 9576 17.94% 1317 -2.81% -1502
5 0.3275 8074 20.29% 10830 9000 16.86% 926 -3.43% -1830
Total 39797 100.00% 53381 53381 100.00% 13584 0.00% 0
Pre-CSR Cohorts Post-CSR Cohorts Difference
Teacher
Numbers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Quintile
Mean
Value-added
Actual
Count
Actual
Percent
Counterfactual
Count
Actual
Count
Actual
Percent
Actual
Count
(5)-(2)
Actual
Percent
(6)-(3)
Counterfactual
Count
(5)-(4)
1 -0.4074 435 20.01% 622 831 26.73% 396 6.72% 209
2 -0.1507 435 20.01% 622 648 20.84% 213 0.83% 26
3 -0.0261 435 20.01% 622 560 18.01% 125 -2.00% -62
4 0.0966 435 20.01% 622 542 17.43% 107 -2.58% -80
5 0.3275 434 19.96% 621 528 16.98% 94 -2.98% -93
Total 2174 100.00% 3109 3109 100.00% 935 0.00% 0
Focusing on the counterfactual difference, we see 4,319 students (8.09% of
all students assigned to incoming teachers) “shifted” from a teacher in the top
three quintiles to one in the bottom bottom two due to the lower quality of
post-CSR cohorts, with 3,868 (7.25%) being assigned to teachers in the bottom
twenty percent. Even if the additional students assigned to a teacher in the
lowest quintile would have only had a second quintile teacher in the absence of
a fall in quality, the average difference in quality across these groups of 25.67%
(40.74-15.07) of a test score standard deviation represents a large difference
in teacher quality. The effect on some of these students will be even larger if
they had been displaced from having a higher quintile teacher. Whether this
represents a large number of affected students is subjective, however it does
seem clear that for particular students the shift in quality was potentially quite
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large.
Finally, note that in the absence of CSR, there would have been fewer
teachers hired in post-CSR cohorts implying fewer students assigned to new
hires in those years. Rather, they would have received a more tenured teacher
who, due to experience and selective attrition, would be of higher quality on
average. Therefore, the actual number of affected students is likely larger.
6 Conclusion
The results presented above provide little support for the conclusion that a
drop in the quality of newly hired teachers explains the lack of an estimated
achievement gain from CSR in State X. While there was a modest decrease in
student performance attributable to teachers (due to quality and inexperience)
with the policy, this decrease was experienced by both treated and untreated
schools alike. These spillovers imply that the disappointing CSR effects found
in quasi-experimental research cannot be explained by differential changes in
the quality of newly hired teachers.
That said, the general fall in quality suggests there may have been a neg-
ative effect of CSR on achievement not captured by the quasi-experimental
estimates. We do find this effect to be of modest size and only short-term
as the lowest performing teachers in each post-policy cohort were the most
likely to leave in subsequent years. However, for students taught by the lowest
quality marginally hired teachers, the effect was potentially large.
Given that entering teacher quality does not play a large role in the failure
of State X’s CSR program to achieve expected gains, exploring alternative
mechanisms is an important next step. One possibility is that other input levels
may have changed, especially in cases in which CSR was implemented without
full funding, as was the case in State X. As noted above, however, differences
in resources directly used by teachers after CSR may also have a limited scope
for explaining CSR performance. Finally, in this paper we focus on the inflow
of teachers into the state public elementary school system that accompanied
CSR. However, exploratory analysis of the movement of teachers across schools
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in response to CSR reveals no clear evidence that schools forced to reduce
class size fared worse in this regard either. Understanding the mechanisms at
play will help to determine whether popular CSR policies can be designed to
promote achievement gains.
These conclusions should be interpreted with caution, as our findings reflect
the experience of a single state for teachers in grades four to six. In other
states or grades, the quality of incoming teachers may fall more dramatically
in response to changes in teacher hiring.
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Appendix
A Additional Tables
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Test Score 1625.46 246.90 District CSR
Asian 0.02 0.14 G4-G8 Average Class-size 24.27 2.86
Black 0.23 0.42 Below Max 0.26 0.44
Hispanic 0.23 0.42 Q1 0.20 0.40
Other Race 0.03 0.18 Q2 0.23 0.42
Female 0.50 0.50 Q3 0.17 0.37
Disabled 0.12 0.33 Q4 0.14 0.35
Free or Reduced Lunch 0.50 0.50 School CSR
Limited English 0.04 0.20 G4-G8 AverageClass-size 20.83 3.15
Age 10.67 1.00 Below Max 0.71 0.45
Foreign Born 0.09 0.28 Q1 0.07 0.26
Days Present 166.75 21.04 Q2 0.07 0.26
Days Absent 7.72 7.70 Q3 0.07 0.26
Lagged Peer Score 1515.01 169.72 Q4 0.07 0.26
Class-size G4 20.86 8.70 Entry Cohorts
Class-size G5 22.49 11.07 2001-2002 0.10 0.30
Class-size G6 82.46 35.32 2002-2003 0.09 0.29
Teacher Experience 10.77 10.35 2003-2004 0.10 0.30
2004-2005 0.11 0.31
2005-2006 0.10 0.30
2006-2007 0.09 0.29
2007-2008 0.07 0.25
Source: State X Administrative Data
Appendix Table 2: Estimates from Pooled OLS Regressions
Specification Cohort Cohort-by-Year
Equation (4.1) (5.1)
Prior Math Score 0.706*** 0.706***
(0.00564) (0.00564)
Asian 0.0947*** 0.0947***
(0.00515) (0.00511)
Black -0.137*** -0.137***
(0.00347) (0.00347)
Hispanic -0.0273*** -0.0273***
(0.00242) (0.00244)
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Other Race -0.0239*** -0.0240***
(0.00229) (0.00231)
Female -0.0160*** -0.0160***
(0.00148) (0.00148)
Disabled -0.185*** -0.185***
(0.0124) (0.0125)
Free or Reduced Lunch -0.0585*** -0.0584***
(0.00141) (0.00140)
Limited English -0.0738*** -0.0742***
(0.01000) (0.0100)
Age -0.0555*** -0.0554***
(0.00322) (0.00322)
Foreign Born 0.0706*** 0.0706***
(0.00354) (0.00356)
Days Present 0.00109*** 0.00108***
(3.58e-05) (3.56e-05)
Days Absent -0.00500*** -0.00500***
(0.000293) (0.000293)
Experience 0.00731*** 0.00502***
(0.000890) (0.000699)
Experience Sq -0.000341*** -0.000231***
(4.72e-05) (3.40e-05)
Experience Cu 4.23e-06*** 2.76e-06***
(6.92e-07) (4.39e-07)
Lagged Peer Score 0.0799*** 0.0789***
(0.0131) (0.0131)
Class Size 8.97e-05 5.00e-06
(0.000252) (0.000258)
Class Size*G5 -7.95e-05 -2.58e-05
(0.000412) (0.000429)
Class Size*G6 -0.000535 -0.000540*
(0.000328) (0.000320)
Observations 2,752,060 2,752,060
R-squared 0.653 0.653
Robust standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 3: Cohort Effect Estimates for Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior Score Lag Gain Gain Lag Lag
Estimator OLS FE FE FDIV OLS
Entry Cohort
2000-2001 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0017
N=4051 (0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0022) (0.0022)
2001-2002 -0.0054*** -0.0053 -0.0046 -0.0036 -0.0035*
N=3217 (0.0018) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0025) (0.0020)
2002-2003 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0057** -0.0032
N=3314 (0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0088) (0.0027) (0.0020)
2003-2004 -0.0043 -0.0139*** -0.0113* -0.0119*** -0.0032*
N=3985 (0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0026) (0.0019)
2004-2005 -0.0123*** -0.0194*** -0.0202*** -0.0141*** -0.0107***
N=4791 (0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0022) (0.0021)
2005-2006 -0.0179*** -0.0296*** -0.0287*** -0.0211*** -0.0172***
N=5167 (0.0022) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0028) (0.0028)
2006-2007 -0.0191*** -0.0255*** -0.0242*** -0.0220*** -0.0177***
N=5260 (0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0023)
2007-2008 -0.0136*** -0.0068 -0.0065 -0.0077** -0.0157***
N=4829 (0.0029) (0.0069) (0.0058) (0.0032) (0.0038)
Fixed Effects
Student No Yes Yes Yes No
School Yes No Yes No No
Grade Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes No
School-Grade-Year No No No No Yes
Observations 2,761,971 2,761,971 2,761,971 1,336,719 2,761,971
R-Squared 0.613 0.377 0.381 - 0.624
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 4: Alternative Fixed Effect Combinations
(1) (2) (3)
Prior Score Lag Lag Lag
Estimator OLS OLS OLS
Entry Cohort
2000-2001 0.00501* 0.00425 0.00456
N=3957 (0.00286) (0.00300) (0.00292)
2001-2002 -0.00202 -0.00320 -0.00177
N=3023 (0.00361) (0.00291) (0.00336)
2002-2003 -0.00765*** -0.0106*** -0.00764***
N=3171 (0.00214) (0.00276) (0.00269)
2003-2004 -0.0154*** -0.0156*** -0.0157***
N=3719 (0.00508) (0.00432) (0.00476)
2004-2005 -0.0206*** -0.0216*** -0.0215***
N=4497 (0.00431) (0.00415) (0.00448)
2005-2006 -0.0278*** -0.0281*** -0.0302***
N=4714 (0.00257) (0.00234) (0.00237)
2006-2007 -0.0308*** -0.0315*** -0.0321***
N=4882 (0.00403) (0.00378) (0.00405)
2007-2008 -0.0279*** -0.0250*** -0.0271***
N=4463 (0.00406) (0.00438) (0.00444)
Fixed Effects
School No No Yes
Grade Yes No No
Year No Yes No
School-Year Yes No No
School-Grade No Yes No
Grade-Year No No Yes
Observations 2,752,060 2,752,060 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.663 0.658 0.653
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Measuring Teacher Quality
The purpose of value-added models (VAMs) is to separate the portion of stu-
dent growth attributable to particular teachers from the many other possible
sources of growth. Viewed in this light, the challenges of VAM estimation are
those faced in identifying causal relationships with panel data more generally.
VAM estimation has proven to be difficult in non-experimental settings and
there is no consensus on what the best model of student achievement is or the
best approach to estimating the portion attributable to teachers (McCaffrey
et al. 2004; Kane & Staiger 2008, Rothstein 2009, 2010; Koedel & Betts 2011).
Much of this difficulty stems from the non-random assignment of students to
teachers both within and across schools.
The following discussion draws heavily from prior work on the assump-
tions applied to the education production function underlying VAM estima-
tion (Todd & Wolpin 2003; Harris, Sass, & Semykina 2011; Guarino, Reckase,
& Wooldridge 2015). This discussion should be thought of as a guide for con-
sidering the issues that arise in VAM estimation, rather than outlining a more
formal structural model of education production to be estimated. The starting
point for the value-added framework is a very general model that specifies a
student’s achievement in a particular year as a function of both current and
past inputs to the education process and the student’s unobserved ability:
Ait =ft(Xit, . . . , Xi0, Eit, . . . , Ei0, ci, uit) (B.1)
where
Ait is the achievement of student i in year t
Xit is a vector of family and student characteristics for student i in year t
Eit is a vector of education inputs for student i in year t
ci is unobserved student ability
uit is an idiosyncratic shock to student i’s achievement in year t
Here, the vector Eit can be thought to include indicators for individual teach-
ers or groups of teachers. Given computational and data constraints, several
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assumptions are typically made to yield a tractable estimating equation. First
it is assumed that ft is linear and constant across years:
Ait = αt +Xitβ0+, . . . ,+Xi0βt + Eitγ0 + . . .+ Ei0γt + ηtci + uit (B.2)
Typically, researchers do not have complete data on all prior inputs. To address
the lack of prior inputs, it is common to add and subtract λAit−1 to the right
hand side of (B.2). Assuming that the effect of the inputs decays at a geometric
rate equal to λ and that ηt−ληt−1 is a constant (set to equal one without loss
of generality) allows us to eliminate the lagged inputs and rewrite equation
(B.2) as a function of current inputs and lagged achievement only:
Ait = ζt + λAit−1 +Xitβ0 + Eitγ0 + ci + eit (B.3)
eit = uit − λuit−1
Up to now, the assumptions made on the original model in equation (B.1)
have been primarily data-driven. At this point, there is some choice over
further assumptions imposed on the model. Under the assumptions that eit is
serially uncorrelated and that ci is uncorrelated with the included inputs (or
equal to zero),32 equation (B.3), referred to as the lag score equation from here
on, could be reasonably estimated by OLS.33 While the no-serial-correlation
assumption is by no means trivial, the assumption that ci is uncorrelated with
the inputs is perhaps the most questionable. It seems possible, given non-
random sorting of students and teachers into schools, as well as non-random
assignment of students to teachers within schools, that the student unobserved
ability may be correlated with teacher assignment. Despite these concerns,
there is evidence that this approach may be preferred and so it will serve as
the basis for the main analysis in this paper.
As a sensitivity check, we also consider other value-added models and es-
32This condition would hold if λ ≈ 1 and ηt ≈ ηt−1
33Note that prior achievement is also a function of the unobserved student heterogeneity
term, and is therefore endogenous in (7.3) when ci is not zero and ignored. This certainly
leads to inconsistent estimates of λ, but the extent to which this bias is propagated in the
estimated teacher effects is unclear.
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timators. Briefly, it is also common to assume that λ = 1, and to subtract
Ait−1 from both sides of equation (B.3), yielding a gain score model of student
achievement:
∆Ait = ζt +Xitβ0 + Eitγ0 + ci + νit (B.4)
νit = uit − uit−1
Equation (B.4) could then be estimated by OLS or fixed effects (FE).34 OLS
estimation of (B.4) relaxes the need for no serial correlation in the errors at
the cost of assuming the prior achievement persists completely in determining
current achievement. If λ 6= 1, then this approach effectively introduces an
additional term, (λ− 1)Ait−1, on the right hand side of equation (B.4), which
may lead to an omitted variables bias. Importantly, OLS on (B.4) does not
control for the unobserved student heterogeneity in any way.
FE estimation is particularly appealing, as it relaxes the assumption that
ci is uncorrelated with the inputs. However, FE requires the additional as-
sumption that Xit and Eit are strictly exogenous conditional on ci in (B.4)
for consistent estimation. The strict exogeneity assumption essentially implies
that the inputs in time t are uncorrelated with the unobserved error terms
in every time period.35 Practically speaking, the strict exogeneity assumption
precludes any feedback from realized achievement shocks to future inputs. For
instance, if a principal reacts to a randomly good or bad test score in one
year when determining a future teacher assignment, this would violate strict
exogeneity. As noted by Rothstein (2009, 2010), the fixed effects approach is
useful when assignment to teachers is made based on a static characteristic of
34In the panel data context, the gain score equation is also commonly estimated using
an Empirical Bayes shrinkage estimator (Kane & Staiger, 2008). Note that the shrinkage
factor is determined by the number of observations per group and tends toward one as the
group size becomes large. Since in our preferred specification the groups size is quite large
and is similar across all groups, the Empirical Bayes estimator will yield results very similar
to OLS.
35Note that the strict exogeneity assumption is what precludes the use of fixed effects on
the lag score equation as well. The lag score equation necessarily violates strict exogeneity
by including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor since Ait−1 must be correlated
with the error term in period t-1.
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the student. The usefulness of FE estimation breaks down some when assign-
ment decisions are made dynamically based on new information gathered over
time by the relevant decision makers, be it principals, parents, or the students.
Finally, it has become more common to estimate teacher value-added us-
ing approaches based on the dynamic GMM estimator found in Arellano &
Bond (1991) (see Koedel & Betts 2011). Researchers taking this approach
either use the Arellano & Bond GMM estimator, or a 2SLS version based on
identical moment conditions, here referred to as the First-Differenced Instru-
mental Variables (FDIV) estimator.36 Specifically, a first-differenced version
of the lag score equation (B.3) is estimated using twice-lagged test scores as
an instrument for the lagged gain score. This estimator directly addresses the
presence of ci in (B.3) through the first-differencing while also avoiding the
problem that including lagged achievement violates strict exogeneity with the
use of instrumental variables. Importantly, this approach still requires strict
exogeneity of the other regressors. While this assumption could be relaxed
by using lagged regressors as instruments, as is done for prior achievement,
this has not been common in the value-added literature. Most importantly,
the Arellano & Bond-inspired approach requires that the errors in (B.3) not
be serially correlated for twice lagged achievement to be a valid instrument.
Finally, these approaches require an additional year of data for each student,
thereby reducing the sample with which teacher value-added can be calculated.
C CSR Effect Estimates
Here, we estimate the CSR policy effect within the framework discussed in
section 4. These results will complement a prior paper on CSR effects in State
X to confirm that it fell short of the potential experimental gains from reducing
class size for the sample and model used here. Specifically, equation (4.1) is
adapted by replacing the cohort indicators, teacher experience, and class size
36The GMM and FDIV approaches are identical if the optimal GMM weighting matrix is
replaced by an identity matrix.
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variables with CSR treatment-by-year indicators:
Aigst =ζt + λAigst−1 +Xigstβ + (T × Y earst)γ1 + γ2A−igst−1 + φg (C.1)
+ ci + δs + eigst
Two separate regressions are estimated based on school- or district- level CSR
enforcement. For the district-level enforcement, treatment T equals 1 for
districts that were above the new class-size maximum in the year before CSR,
and 0 otherwise. The school-level treatment status is similarly determined
by the school average class size the year prior to school-level enforcement.
It is important to note that the regressions include year and school dummy
variables and the omitted treatment category is for the 2001-2002 school year.37
Table C1 presents the estimates of equation (C.1) for district- and school-level
CSR with district-enforcement years shaded light gray and school-enforcement
years in dark gray. Note that these regressions use test scores standardized
within grade and year as the dependent variable. Beginning with the district-
CSR results, most of the estimated CSR achievement effects are small and not
statistically different from either zero or the estimated pre-CSR treatment-year
interaction coefficient (T x 2002-2003 ). The one exception is the 2004-2005
effect, estimated to be a statistically significant 0.0264 standard deviations.
While statistically significant, the point estimate is practically small. As a
rough point of comparison, a simple prediction of the potential effect of CSR
based on the STAR estimates of Krueger (1999) would be on the order of
one-eighth of a standard deviation.38 Even the ninety-five percent confidence
37While the data includes two pre-policy years, perfect collinearity between the treatment-
year interactions and the school fixed effects requires omitting the 2001-2002 school year
treatment interaction. Importantly, when we shift our focus to estimating cohort effects, we
can identify three pre-policy cohorts.
38Krueger estimates the small class effect in third grade (the closest grade to those consid-
ered here) to be roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation. This corresponds to an average
difference in class-size of eight students, from 24 to 16. State X’s average class-size change
in fourth through eighth grade was five students, from 24 to 19. Assuming a linear effect
of class-size, the Krueger estimates from Tennessee suggest an effect of one-fortieth of a
standard deviation per student which gives the simple prediction of one-eighth. This Ten-
nessee STAR Benchmark can be thought of as a rough guide for assessing CSR and cohort
performance. While it is not clear what magnitude of achievement effects would constitute
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Table C1: Estimated CSR Mathematics
Achievement Effects for State X
CSR Level District School
Tx2002-2003 -0.0170 -0.0323
(0.0180) (0.0244)
Tx2003-2004 0.0163 -0.0284*
(0.0152) (0.0143)
Tx2004-200 5 0.0264** -0.00604
(0.0125) (0.0102)
Tx2005-2006 0.00902 -0.0459***
(0.0183) (0.0164)
Tx2006-2007 -0.00522 -0.0410*
(0.0186) (0.0231)
Tx2007-2008 0.00915 -0.0273
(0.0156) (0.0216)
Observations 2,752,060 2,716,399
R-squared 0.653 0.653
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;
District (school) level for district (school) CSR
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
intervals for these estimates fall short of half of the rough Tennessee STAR
benchmark.
As shown by the results in the last column of Table C1, the treatment-by-
year effects after the switch to school-level enforcement during the 2006-2007
school year are negative. The interpretation of these results is made more
difficult by the fact that there are also statistically significant negative CSR
achievement effects estimated prior to the switch to school-level enforcement.
One potential explanation is that those schools farthest from meeting the
class-size requirements in 2006-2007 were forced to allocate more resources to
class-size reduction in anticipation of the switch in enforcement.
The results found in Table C1 generally concur with those found in State
X in a prior paper using similar data and treatment definitions, but employing
a Comparative Interrupted Time Series estimation approach. Both suggest,
a successful CSR policy, having an external, experimental comparison is preferred to simply
testing for statistically significant estimates.
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at most, small positive effects of CSR when treatment is defined by pre-CSR
district level class-size averages and potentially negative effects for estimates
based on school-level treatment status. A full investigation of the potential
issues in estimating CSR effects in State X is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is reassuring that the approach adopted here yields roughly similar results
to the previous paper on CSR achievement effects in State X. Importantly the
evidence here and in the prior work allow for the possibility that the average
quality of the newly hired teachers may have affected the performance of the
policy compared to the experimental results.
D Individual Teacher Value-added
The main estimates found in the paper identify changes in mean cohort perfor-
mance. To allow for a comparison of the entire distribution of teacher quality
over time, individual teacher value-added is also estimated. We do this two
ways. First estimating constant effects for each teacher over time by replacing
the cohort indicators in (4.1) with indicators for each teacher. We similarly
estimate teacher-by-year effects to capture potentially different patterns of hu-
man capital growth. We present results for the teacher-by-year effects here as
they more directly relate to the year-to-year effect on students by each cohort.
Teachers are given a percentile rank based on their estimated value-added rel-
ative to all the teachers in the sample. Figure D1 displays histograms of the
distribution of teacher percentile ranks for each entry cohort by year. The solid
line on each graph represents a uniform distribution of percentile ranks (i.e.,
the distribution for a cohort if a given teacher from that cohort was equally
likely to be ranked anywhere in the overall distribution). Starting in each
cohorts first year, the percentile rank distribution of the post-CSR cohorts
(2003-04 to 2007-08) show many more teachers at the low end of the distribu-
tion than the pre-CSR cohorts (2001-02 and 2002-03).39 Indeed, the pre-CSR
cohort first year distributions are nearly uniform while the post-CSR cohorts
39The 2000-01 cohort has been excluded since we can only estimate value-added starting
with the second year for this cohort.
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show a higher probability of being in the lowest quintile. As the post-CSR
cohorts evolve over time, due to human capital growth and attrition we see
that these cohort differences weaken, reflecting the mean cohort effect results.
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E Cohort Effects by CSR Pressure
The estimates of equations (4.1) can be thought of as identifying the state-
wide general equilibrium relationship between hiring cohorts and student per-
formance. However, it is possible that the CSR policy had more bite in schools
farther away from the new class-size maximums. In fact, the hypothesis that
changes in teacher quality can explain CSR performance is based on this no-
tion. To be consistent with the teacher quality hypothesis, we would need to
see teacher quality fall more for those districts and schools which were consid-
ered treated in the prior CSR effect estimates based on pre-policy class-sizes.
Table E1 shows the estimates from specifications in which the entry cohorts
are further divided based on the amount of CSR pressure the school was under.
This grouping is done based on both the district averages prior to CSR and
the school averages prior to the change to school-level enforcement. Those
schools already below the maximums are included in the None group while
the remaining schools are divided into quartiles based on average class size.
Starting with the district groupings, the estimates show that across the board
all schools saw a decline in the performance of new teachers over the imple-
mentation of CSR. Importantly, it is not the case that the estimated effects are
monotonically increasing in magnitude with increases in CSR pressure. Taken
together, it appears that CSR-induced hiring did not just impact the quality of
new teachers for schools originally above the new class-size maximums. Rather
it suggests either a more general trend in cohort quality or that the untreated
schools were still forced to move along the effective teacher supply curve as
candidates they may have otherwise hired to fill openings created by turnover
and enrollment growth were hired by nearby schools facing CSR pressure.
Similarly, the results for the school-level disaggregation do not consistently
tell a story that CSR lowered incoming teacher quality disproportionately
for treated schools. One exception, however, is in the year before school-
level enforcement for those schools farthest from reaching the new maximums
(Q4). These schools, which were likely pre-empting the switch to school-level
enforcement in the following year, had a hiring cohort estimated to be 0.0617
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Table E1: Estimates of New Cohort Effects by CSR Intensity
CSR Intensity None Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Entry Cohort District Enforcement
2000-2001 -0.0020 0.0042 0.0122* 0.0038 0.0051***
(0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0008)
2001-2002 -0.0052 -0.0030 0.0022 -0.0159 0.0062***
(0.0077) (0.0041) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0013)
2002-2003 -0.0153*** 0.0045 -0.0001 -0.0183*** -0.0192***
(0.0055) (0.0086) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0028)
2003-2004 -0.0252*** -0.0191 -0.0151*** -0.0168* 0.0049**
(0.0063) (0.0121) (0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0020)
2004-2005 -0.0229*** -0.0285*** -0.0159** -0.0372*** -0.0056***
(0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0096) (0.0015)
2005-2006 -0.0322*** -0.0235*** -0.0329*** -0.0273*** -0.0334***
(0.0050) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0039) (0.0028)
2006-2007 -0.0390*** -0.0172** -0.0212*** -0.0667*** -0.0226***
(0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0041)
2007-2008 -0.0358*** -0.0389*** -0.0247*** -0.0162 -0.0076***
(0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0126) (0.0024)
Observations 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.0653
Entry Cohort School Enforcement
2000-2001 0.0061 -0.0143* 0.0046 0.0005 0.0065
(0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0075)
2001-2002 -0.0078* -0.0137 -0.0150 0.0056 0.0498***
(0.0046) (0.0181) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0056)
2002-2003 -0.0067* -0.0214* -0.0197* -0.0072 -0.0122
(0.0036) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0078)
2003-2004 -0.0220*** -0.0159 -0.0046 0.0043 0.0166*
(0.0044) (0.0100) (0.0125) (0.0164) (0.0087)
2004-2005 -0.0219*** -0.0107 -0.0373 -0.0178 -0.0200*
(0.0045) (0.0113) (0.0231) (0.0126) (0.0113)
2005-2006 -0.0273*** -0.0339** -0.0261** -0.0219** -0.0615***
(0.0036) (0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0085) (0.0037)
2006-2007 -0.0302*** -0.0345*** -0.0501*** -0.0196* -0.0373***
(0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0118) (0.0103) (0.0077)
2007-2008 -0.0306*** -0.0320* -0.0203 0.0040 -0.0158*
(0.0048) (0.0184) (0.0166) (0.0144) (0.0080)
Observations 2,752,060
R-Squared 0.0653
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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test score standard deviations worse than the baseline teachers, while the other
schools saw cohorts between 0.0219 and 0.0326 standard deviations worse.
These results by CSR pressure cast doubt on the teacher quality hypothesis.40
F New Teacher Contribution to Mean Achieve-
ment
To summarize the contribution of cohort quality and experience on overall
student achievement, we calculate COHORT tγˆ1 and fˆ(EXPt) = EXPtβˆ1 +
EXP 2t βˆ2+EXP
3
t βˆ3. Both the total contribution and the separate contribution
of each component are presented in Table F1, along with the change since
2001. While the contribution attributable to these components falls over the
introduction of CSR, even in the worst year this represents only a difference
of 0.0154 standard deviations. This difference is driven more by the relative
performance of the cohorts than by the drop in teacher experience.41
40Using a similar approach, disaggregating the entry cohorts by quartiles of school-level
mean student characteristics (free or reduced lunch status, Black, or Hispanic) yields simi-
larly mixed results with no clear evidence that schools serving more disadvantaged students
saw disproportionately worse hiring cohorts.
41Recall that the experience profile can be thought to capture the effects of differential
attrition and within school sorting of students to more experienced teachers, in addition to
human capital accumulation.
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Table F1: Estimated Contribution of Cohort Composition and Experience to Average Achievement
Achievement Contribution Change from 2001-2002
Year COHORTtγ̂1 f̂(EXPt) Total COHORTtγ̂1 f̂(EXPt) Total
2001-2002 -0.0059*** 0.0452*** 0.0393*** - - -
(0.0011) (0.0052) (0.0051) - - -
2002-2003 -0.0066*** 0.0452*** 0.0386*** -0.0007 0.0000*** -0.0007*
(0.0011) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0004)
2003-2004 -0.0082*** 0.0448*** 0.0366*** -0.0024*** -0.0004*** -0.0028***
(0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0008)
2004-2005 -0.0107*** 0.0443*** 0.0335*** -0.0048*** -0.001*** -0.0058***
(0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0013)
2005-2006 -0.0142*** 0.0442*** 0.0299*** -0.0084*** -0.001*** -0.0094***
(0.0017) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.001)
2006-2007 -0.0176*** 0.0434*** 0.0258*** -0.0117*** -0.0018*** -0.0135***
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0014)
2007-2008 -0.0195*** 0.0434*** 0.0239*** -0.0136*** -0.0018*** -0.0154***
(0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0017)
Standard errors clustered at the District level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
G Comparison to North Carolina Teacher Data
Ideally, we would like to have a clean comparison state to use as control group
when estimating the potential hiring spillover effects of CSR. Unfortunately,
given differences across states in institutional and economic factors coupled
with the finding in the literature that teachers tend to focus job search in
small geographic areas, such comparisons may not be very clean. To explore
this, we use publicly available state-wide data from North Carolina, a state
that does have similar data to State X over the time period we study. While
we cannot make direct comparisons to all the data series presented in Section
3, there are three comparable series that can be matched in the following table.
Appendix Table G1:State X and North Carolina Teacher Characteristics
State X Grades 4-6 North Carolina All Grades
No Prior Experience Advanced Degree No Prior Experience Advanced Degree
Percent of Stock Percent of Flow Percent of Stock Percent of Stock Percent of Flow Percent of Stock
School Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000-01 18.15% 39.88% 31.75% 6.67% 67.13% 36.40%
2001-02 17.63% 42.55% 31.89% 6.25% 64.06% 36.21%
2002-03 19.35% 45.45% 33.87% 5.68% 62.62% 36.36%
2003-04 17.44% 47.81% 33.12% 6.05% 62.43% 36.79%
2004-05 18.49% 46.61% 33.27% 6.51% 63.52% 36.00%
2005-06 19.45% 46.85% 34.00% 6.47% 61.79% 35.77%
2006-07 17.87% 45.52% 33.23% 6.11% 60.81% 36.58%
2007-08 16.07% 42.58% 6.40% 62.09%
As we can see, State X and North Carolina are quite different over this
time period, particularly when looking at teacher experience. State X had a
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much larger proportion of completely new teachers in the stock than North
Carolina (column (1) versus column (4)), but a much smaller proportion of
the teachers seen entering State X public schools were complete novices than
in North Carolina (column (2) versus column (5)). While this suggests that
North Carolina may not be a clear control state, it does point to the idea
that the size of the year-to-year fluctuations in State X might be in line with
the idiosyncratic year-to-year movements in these variables. Of course, this
analysis does have not consider any relevant policy changes may have occurred
in North Carolina over this period. More generally, this comparison does not
tell us how value-added may compare across hiring cohorts int he two states.
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